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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 19065

JAY RICHARD NEWTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Aggravated
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated <; 76-6-302, 1953 (as amended), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Dennis Frederick, Judge presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Jay Richard Newton was found guilty by a
unanimous jury of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony.
He was sentenced to be committed to the Utah State Prison for
indeterminate term as provided by law on February 16, 1983.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment of
the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 6, 1981, Sandra Shepard was working in her
capacity as a registered pharmacist at Salt Lake Drug East,
located at 1519 South 1500 East (T. 3).

on that day Ms.

Shepard was alone in the store ( T. 4), anc'I was working in the
pharmacy area (T. 18), which had a raised floor and counter in
front of it (T. 7).

All of the lights were on in the

drugstore and it was daylight (T. 7).
At about 9:20 a.m., Ms. Shepard heard the door open
and looked up.

She saw a man enter the store (T. 16).

later identified this man as appellant (T. 13, 30).

She

She went

out of the pharmacy section to see what he wanted (T. 18).
She had never seen him before (T. 14).
Appellant was within arm's length of Ms. Shepard and
stood directly in front of her (T. 21).

Appellant then shoved

Ms. Shepard back into the pharmacy (T. 5, 6).

He told her he

wanted all of her drugs, pulled out a gun (T. 4), and shoved
it in her face (T. 5).
He handed her a zippered case to put them in (T. 5,
6).

It was a flat, dark brown attache type case made out of

naugahyde (T. 6).
Appellant stood right next to Ms. Shepard and told
her to hurry up.

She began filling the case with drugs.

Appellant wanted Dylotid, but she had none (T. R).
Shepard completed filling up the case (T. 7).
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Ms.

Appellant then took the money out of the cash
register (about $40-$50 were taken (T. 9) ), and started to
leave.
down.

Appellant told Ms. Shepard to lay on the floor face
He then ran out the front door (T. 9).
Ms. Shepard got up and called the police (T. 9).

upon the police's arrival approximately 15-20 minutes later
(T. 22) Ms. Shepard gave the police the following description
of the drugstore intruder:
light brown hair.

a white man with relatively long

His height was 5'4"-5'5", and Shepard

estimated his weight was 140 lbs. (T. 26).

She told the

police that the robber was wearing old, washed-out levis and
had a jacket which was also made of washed-out levis (T. 4).
The robber had left this jacket behind, and Ms. Shepard gave
it to the police (T. 26).
Ms. Shepard was shown two sets of black and white
photographs.
photos.

The first array consisted of six or seven

Ms. Shepard identified no one from that group.

When

the second array was presented a week to two weeks after the
robbery (T. 12), however, Ms. Shepard positively identified
appellant as the man who had robbed her (T. 13).
Ms. Shepard subsequently identified appellant at the
preliminary hearing and also or several occasions after that
time in court (T. 30).
Appellant was found guilty of aggravated robbery (T.
53) by a unanimous jury(T. 54).

He was committed to the Utah

State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by law.
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ARGUMENT
POIIJT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RP.FUSED TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIOtlS ON THE
NATURE OF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE,

Appellant contends that the eyewitness
identification provided by Ms. Shepard was inadequate,

He

complains that her description to the police was sketchy and
general; that she was too frightened to direct her attention
to the appellant rather than the gun; and that her
to observe the robber was limited.

Appellant maintains that

the inadequacy of this identification mandated a jury
instruction on how to weigh the identification evidence.I
Appellant claims that if the instruction had been given,
would have been a reasonable likelihood that he would have
been acquitted.
Appellant's conclusion, however, is in error in
light of the evidence showing that Ms. Shepard had sufficient
time to observe appellant during the course of the robbery
under excellent lighting conditions (T. 7).

Shepard was able

to positively identify appellant on several occasions (T. 13,
30).

A specific jury instruction on the nature of eyewitness

1 Appellant requested two special jury instructions, both
focusing on essentially the same elements.
These
instructions were based on instructions suggested by the
court in united States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
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identification was therefore not required and was properly
denied by the court.
The test for the adequacy of eyewitness identication
was explained in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and was
adopted by this Court in State v. Mccumber, Utah 622 P.2d 353
(1980).

The Biggers test determines the reliability of the

iclentification by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. Factors to consider in this analysis are the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime, the witness's degree of attention, the accuracy of
any prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated during the identification procedure, and the time
between the crime and the identification.

When this test is

applied to the instant case, it is clear that Ms. Shepard had
no trouble in identifying appellant.
Ms. Shepard had ample opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime.

The store was brightly lit

(T. 7) and appellant was the only person in the store besides
Ms. Shepard (T. 4), undisturbed by other customers.

She stood

within an arm's length of appellant (T. 21), and was able to
observe him the entire time of the robbery (T.

2 2).

Admitted 1 y, Ms. Shepard was alarmed at the sight of the gun,
but she did have an opportunity to observe appellant before he
drew the gun (T. 5), and a sufficient time after to closely
observe him.

Ms. Shepard was therefore able to direct a

considerable amount of her attention towards appellant.
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Ms. Shepard's description of appellant did vary
somewhat with his actual appearance but it was certainly
understandable under the circumstances and was not so far
removed from actuality to make it unlikely that appellant was
the criminal.

She described a white male with longish light

brown hair, 5'5", and 140 lbs.

(T. 26), or about the same

height and weight as Ms. She pa rd.

The record is not clear on

this point, although it appears that appellant is slightly
taller and heavier than this initial description. On the day
of the robbery, however, Ms. Shepard was wearing shoes with
heels 2 1/2 -

3" inches high,

(T. 32) which would help to

explain the possible discrepancy.

When Ms. Shepard said he

was close to her own height, her height on that day was
approximately 5'8" rather than 5'5".
Ms. Shepard's level of certainty is perhaps the most
important part of her identification.

Ms. Shepard

consistently made positive identification of appellant in the
photo array, at the preliminary hearing, and in court (T. 30),
There was no doubt in her mind that appellant robbed her.

Ms.

Shepard may have been somewhat inexpert at verbalizing
descriptions since she is not trained in such a skill or used
to giving them, but she was certainly able to recognize
appellant as the robber of the drugstore.
The length of time between the crime and the
photographic array was only a week to two weeks after the
robbery (T.

28), a very short period of time.
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The Biggers, supra analysis thus leaves no room for
doubt that Ms. Shepard could have been mistaken in her
identification.

There is certainly no serious doubt present

in Ms. Shepard's identification of appellant which is the type
of case that the Telfaire, supra, instructions contemplated.
Therefore, appellant was not entitled to this particular jury
instruction.

No reasonable doubt as to the credibility of the

evidence existed.
Appellant repeatedly makes the point that eyewitness
identification may sometimes be inaccurate.

There is no doubt

that this observation is true, but the fact remains that in
this particular case, positive eyewitness identification was
made with an absence of any evidence drawing these
identifications into serious doubt.
Since there was no significant question about the
accuracy of the identification, no special instruction is
required.

Even the cases that appellant relies on agree with

this proposition.

United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 517, 527

(1rd. Cir. 1971) stated that:
If there is a high degree of precision and
certainty in his expression, which is
consisted with any prior statements and
unshaken on cross-examination, the
statement of the witness may be regarded
as a statement of fact.
Under these circumstances, no identification instruction is
required.
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The court in State v. Warren, 63S r.2d 12n1 (Kan.
1981) held that only where there is a serious question about
the reliability of the identification should a cautionary
instruction be given advising the jury as to the factors to
considered in weighing the credibility of the eyewitness
identification testimony.

This point was explained in a later

Kansas case, State v. Brown, 638 P.2d 912 (Kan. 1QR2), where
the court held that the eyewitness identification instruction
was unnecessary.

The court reasoned that even though

eyewitness identification was a critical part of the case,
there was no serious question about the reliability of the
identification.
Appellant quotes United States v. Telfaire, supra,
to illustrate the dangers of identification testimony.

Yet

the instruction given hy the trial court in Telfaire was
adequate and in no way prejudicial to the defendant. That
instruction was similar to the instruction given in the
instant case.

It emphasized that the government had to prow

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took property with
intent to steal; and that defendant was present at the time
when, and at the place where, the offense was committed.
government had to prove all the elements.

The

The court said that

it was "satisfied that the attention of the jury was
significantly focused on the issue of identity."
556.

Telfaire at

The court also mentioned that the case presentea nonr ,,'

the special difficulties often presented by inentification
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1

testimony.

The same is true of the instant case.
Perhaps the most important reason for dismissing

appellant's contention is that the jury instructions that were
issued by the trial judge essentially focused on the critical
factors contained in appellant's rejected instruction.

The

jury therefore was adequately instructed on the issue of the
robber's identity and Ms. Shepard's credibility as a witness.

The instructions that were given informed the jury
that the state had to prove that appellant committed all of
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable ooubt ( R.
101), that the jury decides the weight of the evidence (R.
105), and that it was not bound to believe what witnesses say
(R. 105).

The jury was further instructed that in evaluating

the credibility of the witnesses that it could consider their
deportment, the reasonableness of their statements, their
frankness or candor, opportunity to know, ability to
understand, and their capacity to remember (R. 106).

The jury

also was advised in making those determinations that it was to
consider all the circumstances.

Thus, the jury's attention

was significantly directed towards the Telfaire - type of
considerations with respect to the issue of the defendant's
ioentity.

If the purpose of appellant's requested

instructions were aoequately covered in the instructions that
were actually given, appellant has no cause to complain.
Court in State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (1980)
made the following statement:

-'l-

This

The principal point of rlefenrlant's
proposed instruction dealt with the
state's burden of proof and the factors to
be considered in weighing the testimony of
the eyewitness.
All of the factors were
adequately dealt with in other
instruct ions presented to the i ury by the
trial court.
As a result, we cannot agree
that the rlenial of the proposed
instruction constituted reversible error.
As

appellant pointed out, the Mccumber opinion does not

disclose which instruction was actually given to the jury, so
no direct comparison of the instruction of Mccumber can be
made with those of the instant case to test for their
adequacy.

However, another Utah case, State v. Schaffer,

Utah, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1981) was more explicit.

In

Schaffer, defendant wanted the same type of instruction as the
appellant wanted in the instant case.

In discussing the

instructions that were actually given, the Court made this
observation:
Here, the jury was instructed that the
burden was on the State to prove defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that
they were the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witnesses and that, in
order to convict, they must find that
defendant committed all of the elements
constituting the offense.
Taking these
instructions as a whole, as is proper •
we find that they adequately advised the
jury on the law pertaining to this case.
In the instant case, these same instructions were given.

This

leads to the conclusion that, as in Schaffer, the trial co11rt
sufficiently advised the jury of both the appropriate law tlidt
should apply to the facts of the case and the factors
-10-

involved in reviewing the evidence adduced at trial.
Appellant points to the fact that the Telfaire
instruction has been adopted in many jurisdictions.

This is

true, but it is also true that a significant number of state
courts follow the rule that a trial court may in its
discretion refuse to give a requested instruction when the
other instructions given adequately and correctly state the
applicable law and alert the jury to its responsibilities as
factfinder.
Moreover, whether to give the specific instruction
lies within the judge's discretion.
649 P.2d 56 (1982).

State v Malmrose, Utah,

The discretion was not abused when there

was no need for the instructions since they were covered in
substance by the instruction given.
P.2d 520 (Colo. 1980).

People v. Estorga, 612

There were no unusual circumstances in

the prosecution that would indicate an abuse of discretion.
The court in State v. Rovles, 598 P.2d 1249, 1252
(Or. App. 1979) made the following statement concerning the
discretion which accompanies the giving of eyewitness
identification instructions:
"Generally, the decision as to
whether to give an instruction on the
reliability of eyewitness identification
will depend on the trial judge's
perception of its desirability in each
case.
Here it was not an abuse of the
trial judge's discretion to refuse to give
it.
In fact, except in unusual
circumstances, it should not be given.
Following the Rovles rationale, there were no unusual
-11-

circumstances in the case at bar which compellecl the giving a
Telfaire instruction.
Appellant contends that this Court has never sairl
the instruct ion is improper and should never be given.

The

instructions will not be consiclered improper if the court
below adequately states the law as applied to the case at
hand, merely because a requested instruction constitutes a
correct statement of the law, does not mean that it should be
given.

It will do more harm than good

if it is redunclant.

A

defendant is not entitled to an instruction which is reclundant
or repetitive of principles enunciated in other instructions,
State v. Mccumber, supra.

Repetition of instruction under

various forms should be discouraged Clews v. People, 377 P.2d
125 (Colo. 1962).
Appellant also maintain that this court has implied
that under certain circumstances these instructions would be
proper.

The only time the giving of the instructions would

proper (and which apparently has yet to occur) would be when
no other instructions adequately covering the issue were
given.
Appellant further states that he is entitled to have
his theory of the case presented to the jury in the form of
written instructions,

This statement is true.

Appellant has

nothing to complain of on this coun, however, because the
instructions which were issued informed the jury of
appellant's theory.

This Court in State v. Schaffer,
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was confronted with a similar argument.

The Court responded

thusly:
Defendant also complains of the trial
court's failure to give his proposed
instruction on identification testimony.
Defendant maintains that identification
was the only issue in his case, and cites
Utah authority to the effect that a
defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case.
Here, the jury was instructed that the
burden was on the state to prove defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that
they were the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witnesses, and that, in
order to convict, they must find that
defendant committed all of the elements
constituting the offense.
Taking these
instructions as a whole, as is proper,
we find that they adequately advised the
jury on the law pertaining to this case.
The same analysis applies to the instant case.
Furthermore, no prejudicial error occurs if the
giving of the requested instruction would not have affected
the outcome of the trial, State v. Mccumber, supra; State v.
Bell, Utah, 563 P.2d 186 (1977).

Appellant has not

demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been
different if the instruction had been given.

Therefore, even

if the instruction should have been given, no reversible error
occurred.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied appellant's
requested instructions on eyewitness i<ientification.
not per se improper, the proposed instructions were
nevertheless redundant of those instructions which were given
to jury and therefore totally unnecessary.

The instructions

the jury received adequately advised them of the potential
problems of eyewitness identification.
Those jurisdictions that routinely allow the
Telfaire type of instructions which appellant requested
maintain that such instruction are not needed when
identification is not a serious question in the case.

Here,

the witness, Ms. Shepard, had the time and opportunity to view
appellant during the course of the drugstore robbery and her
consistent positive identifications of appellant as the person
who robbed the drugstore was not contradicted.
Finally, any error that may have occurred from the
failure to give the instruction was harmless.

The judgment of

the trial court should therefore be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this
19 83.
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of November,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy
of the foregoing Brief, postage prepain to Bardley P. Rich, 44
Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah
November, 1983.

84111, this

of

